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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background to the Study 
The nexus between security and development cannot be over-emphasized, given that 
human security is an important objective of development and its absence has negative 
consequences for development.1
 As a consequence of the general lack of security, a majority of citizens in many 
developing states have resorted to self-help in security provision by using the private, 
non-state sector to address their security needs. Given the correlation between security 
and development, it is pertinent to examine the contribution of all actors to security in a 
state, particularly in the developing world. While various attempts have been made in 
some developing countries to improve upon security provision, these have largely been 
focused on donor-led and driven security sector reforms targeted mainly at state 
security actors, namely the police and law enforcement agencies, armed forces and in 
 Security has traditionally been provided by states to 
citizens. In many developing countries, however, state security provision has largely 
been inadequate, focusing mainly on state preservation against external aggression and 
internal disorder using mainly the military and police, respectively. These are done 
with the active support of the intelligence agencies. This is the so-called hard security, 
which also mainly provides protection to regimes and the elites. Hard security has 
largely been responsible for the neglect of the physical and other socio-economic needs 
(human security) of a majority of citizens. The concept of security adopted in this paper 
refers to human security. 
                                                          
1 Stewart (2004), p.1 
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some cases the judiciary, but largely neglecting the private security sector.2
 Ghana is a relatively peaceful country in a largely restless and turbulent sub-
region. While this perception of safety and security is genuine for the most part, the 
country has witnessed an increase in crime and the perception of criminality and 
insecurity in recent times. The fear of crime is high and rising, particularly in urban 
areas where there has been an increase in all types of crimes, including violent crimes 
like murder, rape and armed robbery, with a correspondingly low rate of apprehension 
of perpetrators by law enforcement agents.
 The term 
non-state actors as used in this paper broadly refers to individuals, groups and 
organisations that provide security services, but are not part of the formal, statutory 
institutions and agencies mandated to provide security related services, such as the 
police, the military, intelligence agencies, or para-military organisations like the 
immigration Service. 
3  Meanwhile, the country has no national 
crime prevention strategy, whilst the state security and law enforcement agencies, 
particularly the police, are viewed as under-resourced, corrupt and inefficient, and 
consequently unable to provide any security dividend.4
 This increased sense of insecurity, coupled with the availability of various 
actors to fill this security gap, has led to an increase in the number of people seeking 
security solutions from the private sphere. Additionally, the country’s political stability, 
combined with increased investor activities in the natural resources sector, has led to a 
corresponding need for security services, resulting in a burgeoning commercial, private 
security sector. Thus, a paradoxical situation exists where the peace and stability of the 
 The judicial system is also 
widely regarded by citizens as slow, corrupt and inefficient, leading to a large segment 
of the population seeking justice from non-state systems. 
                                                          
2 Lilly & von Tangen Page (2002), p.7 
3 Adu-Mireku (2002), p.168 
4 Aning (2006), p.16 
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country has resulted in an increase in the number of commercial, private security 
companies to meet the security needs and demands of international businesses and 
organisations, big patrons of the services offered by these private organizations. 
 Whilst the wealthy are able to afford the services of the commercial, private 
security organisations, a majority of the population are unable to afford them.  
Consequently, in urban areas, crime has shifted to the poorer and more deprived areas, 
whilst rural communities have also been largely neglected by state security agencies. 
The judicial system is also viewed as widely skewed to the interests of businesses and 
the economically well-off, and neglecting the justice needs of the poor.5 The resulting 
insecurity has a negative effect on poverty, inequality and the socio-economic 
development of these communities. Members of such communities are thus forced to 
turn to other non-state and community based systems, which though not necessarily 
legal in some cases, are still largely recognized as legitimate actors in these 
communities, even if they do not always provide equitable security and access to justice 
for all community members.6  This has led to two parallel security systems operating in 
the country; the state system which largely caters for the needs and interests of the elite 
and its network of cronies, and an informal sector, where those without access to the 
state structures retreat.7
 A legal framework exists to regulate the activities of private security actors, but 
this is limited to the activities and operations of the commercial, private security 
organisations, with the law being silent on the activities of other non-state entities in the 
security arena. Much of the discourse in the country on the activities of these other 
 Thus, the security landscape in Ghana is diverse and not 
homogenous, with various actors operating outside the state mechanism to provide 
security to various segments of the population.  
                                                          
5 Atuguba (2009), Presentation on Policing in June  at KAIPTC  
6 Olonisakin et al (2009), p.11 
7 ibid 
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actors relegates them to the realm of criminality, with the impact of their activities being 
generally perceived as negative. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Few known comprehensive empirical studies have been carried out in Ghana or Africa 
as a whole on the role or contribution of non-state actors to the provision of security to 
citizens, rather than the state, in peacetime. However, some empirical and theoretical 
studies have been carried out on the roles and activities of private military and security 
companies in conflict and post-conflict settings.8
Yet, in situations in which the state is increasingly unable to provide adequate 
security for its citizens due to lack of resources, the absence of political will and rising 
social disequilibrium, non-state actors tend to fill the gap created. Nevertheless, there 
have been varied experiences with non-state actors, particularly in fragile political and 
social environments. Although they have helped provide security for citizens, some of 
them have become increasingly politicized and turned into paramilitary vanguards of 
political interests. Others have become instruments used by private citizens to settle 
private scores. In the process, they have swung between criminality and security 
provisioning.  
  
In spite of their growing profile in Ghana there is yet no attempt to enumerate 
and map these non-state security actors, audit their activities and profile the social and 
political implications of their activities. Where discourse has been carried on about 
these groups, it has been to relegate them, particularly those dealing with security and 
safety, to the realm of criminality. This study aims to fill in this gap by examining the 
role and impact that non-state actors have on security in the country. 
In doing this, there are two phenomena of private security provisioning which, 
                                                          
8 Abrahamsen & Williams (2007), p. 131 
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though not directly related to the research topic, have a bearing on security 
provisioning in the country and are thus worth mentioning at this stage. First is the 
provision by the public police, of some security services that could be described as 
‘private’ in the sense that they are provided to some organisations like banks and large 
retail shops with private, commercial interests. Such organisations pay the Ghana Police 
Service for these services. This is done despite the fact that the number of police officers 
is inadequate to effectively provide security to the general population. The second 
phenomenon is the government’s National Youth Employment Programme that 
employs some members of the youth population. In some towns, some of the youth 
employed under this scheme are used to provide security services. Thus, though they 
are not public security agencies mandated to provide security, the security services they 
provide during their employment under this scheme can be said to be semi-formal. This 
paper does not examine these two phenomena; the focus is on private actors that do not 
receive any form of support from the state, and whose organisation and the services 
they provide are privately determined. 
 
Aims and objectives of the Study 
This study aims to collect, examine, analyze and interpret data on the various non-state 
actors involved in the provision of security in Ghana. In the process, it will help 
contribute to the thinking on security provisioning in the country whilst also building 
upon the limited existing knowledge base available on the subject area. To this end, the 
study has the following objectives: 
a. To identify the non-state actors involved in security in Ghana. 
b. To determine the activities they are engaged in. 
c. To determine the impact of their activities on security in the country. 
d. To make recommendations for improving their contribution to Ghana’s security.  
  
9 
Research Questions 
Based on the objectives of the study, and to help achieve the research aims, the study 
was guided by the following research questions: 
a. Which organisations are officially mandated to provide security in the country, 
and what perceptions do ordinary Ghanaians have of these organisations? 
b. To whom do the majority of Ghanaians turn to for security?  
c. Who or what are the non-state security actors in the country and where do they 
get their mandate from? 
d. What activities or services do these non-state actors engage in or provide, and 
what is the impact of their activities on security in the country? 
e. What are the benefits and negative impacts of their activities? 
 
Significance and Limitations of the Study 
The study would provide deeper knowledge of local security dynamics and give an 
insight into measures that could be taken to harness the energies and potentials of such 
groups. In this vein, it could be of value to policy makers involved in the country’s 
security sector and assist to improve upon effective security delivery in the country. It 
could also serve as a basis for future research into the country’s overall strategy for 
providing security whilst contributing to the existing body of literature to address the 
paucity of data in this research area in Ghana. 
The major limitations of the study are the limited availability of empirical data in 
the subject area, resulting in limited access to reference materials to guide the research. 
This was countered by accessing literature on private security provisioning in other 
countries. Also, due to the sensitivity and confusion of some activities lying between a 
grey area of legality and illegality, it is possible some respondents had fears that some 
information they gave might incriminate them.  This could have therefore led to 
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inadequate disclosure of information in some cases. To help counter this, respondents 
were assured of anonymity and confidentiality of all information given, as outlined in 
the King’s College Ethical Approval Guidelines on Conducting Research. Finally, this 
research does not provide an in-depth coverage of the legal and legislative aspects of 
the activities of these actors. The above notwithstanding, efforts were made to ensure 
that the study met all the relevant requirements of good research, and could serve as a 
basis for future research on security in Ghana.  
 
Outline of the Study 
The study is organized into five chapters: chapter one is an introductory chapter that 
provides a background to the study, the problem statement, significance, limitations 
and outline of the study. Chapter two reviews the literature on private security 
provision, a brief overview of the Ghanaian security system and the legal framework 
underpinning the activities of private security organisations in the country. Chapter 
three describes the methodological approach that was employed for the study. This 
includes the research population, sampling techniques and the data collection process. 
Chapter four presents the research findings on the identified non-state actors, their 
organisation and recruitment, the services they provide and their clients. The last 
chapter analyzes the roles and impacts of the activities of the identified non-state actors, 
and concludes with a summary of the main findings of the study and recommendations 
for effectively harnessing the potential of these actors to provide security in the country. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter examines the concept of security, and the role that states have traditionally 
played in its provision. This is followed by a brief history of Ghana’s security agencies. 
The phenomenon of the provision of private security is next examined, to be followed 
by its historical provision by non-state actors, particularly in Ghana. The legal 
framework underpinning the private provision of security in the country follows, and 
the chapter concludes with the conceptual framework of what would constitute 
effective private security provision. 
 
Defining Security 
The concept or notion of security has undergone a progressive change from an 
orthodox, state-centric focus on the usually territorial, military-like protection of states 
and individuals from conflicts and physical harm, to a focus on individuals and their 
various complex and related physical and socio-economic needs, commonly referred to 
as human security.9  Human security recognizes that the security of the state is 
indivisible from that of its citizens, and the values that underpin human security, apart 
from physical safety and survival, include conditions such as access to justice and the 
guarantee of individual freedoms, adequate economic empowerment, and access to 
basic health and educational facilities.10
Traditionally, the state is responsible for the provision of security to its citizens 
 Access to justice and justice provision in all its 
various forms is an important component of human security.  
                                                          
9 Thomas (1999), p. 4 
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as a public good and in much of Africa, this is about protection against local crime and 
personal security, protection of land, property and livestock, access to justice such as 
raising bail or paying fines, the resolution of community disputes, and access to public 
services.11
Justice and security institutions in the developing world, particularly in Africa, 
are a legacy of the colonial period when these institutions were put in place to protect 
the colonial power structures, some of which remained in place after independence. The 
political elite who took over running the affairs of the state after independence, in most 
cases maintained these systems,
  
12
 
 to protect and serve their interests. In addition, many 
of these institutions lack the necessary human capacity and material resources to 
deliver these services on a large scale.  
Brief History and Overview of Ghana’s Security System   
The current state of the state security agencies and judicial system can be traced to the 
colonial era, when institutions were put in place by the colonists to protect and secure 
their economic exploitation of the country. Thus, the Ghanaian Army originated from 
the Gold Coast Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force which was formed to 
consolidate and extend British colonial rule in West Africa.13 The Ghana Police Force 
similarly originated in 1831.14 Whereas at the time, the objective of the police force in 
England was to serve the British public, and as such their actions in England were 
geared to achieve mass legitimacy, in the then-Gold Coast,15
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Alkire (2003), p.33 
 the police force was to 
provide security for the economic exploitation of the country, with little emphasis on 
11 Olonisakin et al (2009), p.13 
12 ibid 
13 Ibeanu & Momoh (2008), p.42 
14 Aning (2006), p.4 
15 The pre-independence name of Ghana  
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serving the community, and this reflected in a para-military orientation.16
Additionally, western models of social control and justice administration were 
introduced to replace traditional systems embodied in the institution of chieftaincy that 
were responsible for peace, security and order in their areas. Under the Native 
Authority Ordinance, chiefs were allowed to administer customary disputes and 
grievances in accordance with western normative traditions of law.
  
17 The police and 
court systems were for the self-preservation of the colonists, and to persecute natives 
who were seen as a threat to their efforts at maximizing taxation revenues and natural 
resources extraction.18
The country has a National Security Council made up of the President, Vice-
President, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, the Interior, and Finance, as well as the 
service chiefs of the Armed Forces, Police Service, Prisons Service, Customs, Military 
Intelligence and External Intelligence. Some of the functions of the National Security 
Council include; considering and taking appropriate measures to safeguard the internal 
and external security of Ghana, and ensuring the collection of information related to the 
national security of Ghana.
 These institutions and mechanisms were basically sustained by 
the political elite of the country after independence to protect their parochial interests 
and for national unity, and little has changed in that approach to security. 
19
                                                          
16 Tankebe (2008), p.74 
 The military is responsible for protecting the country from 
external aggression, the police for preserving law and order and internal security, 
whilst the Bureau of National Investigations and the Research Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for dealing with issues critical to state 
security. The country, however, does not have a national strategy for tackling crime, nor 
any institutions that implement effective anti-crime measures.    
17 Dzivenu (2008), p.1 
18 Ibeanu & Momoh (2008), p.8 
19 Ministry of Justice (2005) 
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Private Security Provision 
The Phenomenon 
The private provision of security functions is not a new phenomenon. Dating back to 
the ancient Greek and Roman empires, private actors have provided security functions 
to states and citizens,20 with quasi-official agencies providing policing services in Britain 
until the emergence of the modern police in 1929, whilst vigilantism was a major 
instrument for social ordering in the USA until the beginning of the twentieth century.21
Security privatization is thus the provision of private security by private actors: 
this is in contrast to the provision of private security by public security agencies, though 
the dichotomy between private and public security is not clear cut.
 
22
Some reasons attributed to the increasing use of private security include the 
impact of globalization and the inability or unwillingness of some states to provide 
security as a public good. Various theories have been propounded to explain the 
development of private security, particularly private policing. Two main theories are 
the fiscal constraints theory and the structuralist theory. Fiscal constraints theory is a 
general term for a range of theories that basically attribute the rise of private policing to 
increased market liberalization, as well as efforts by governments to reduce public 
expenditure and roll back the involvement of states in policing.
 It is also important 
to distinguish between the broader private security phenomenon, and the narrower, 
mainly neo-liberal, western originated phenomenon of commercialized private security, 
where security has become a commodity for sale in the marketplace. 
23
                                                          
20 Holmqvist (2005), p.9 
 Thus, the 
phenomenon is linked to the dominance of neoliberal policies that have emphasized the 
21 Isima (2009), p.2 
22 Bourne (2002), p.16 
23 Jones & Newburn (1998), p. 98 
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outsourcing and privatization of previously public goods and services, including 
security.   
There are two main strands within the fiscal constraints theory, these are the 
liberal democratic strand, which attributes the phenomenon to the consequences of the 
lack of resources for state agencies, and the radical strand, which sees the phenomenon 
as the inevitable development of capitalist logic that has transformed security into a 
commercial commodity. The structuralist theory however attributes the trend to the 
increasing importance of private justice and conflict resolution in the private sphere, 
without recourse to an official system, and is more in line with Foucault’s vision of a 
disciplinary society.24
 
 
The Main Actors 
The privatization of security in contemporary times has manifested itself in two broad 
forms which are motivated by different actors and motives. One is formalized and 
refers to private security organisations consisting mainly of private military companies 
(PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs). The second consists of non-state actors, 
who provide security, usually to the poor and marginalized who are unable to procure 
the services of commercial security, and their services are sometimes ill-defined, and 
they are commonly referred to as informal actors. They include individual security 
provisioning, neighborhood watch committees, traditional security mechanisms and 
vigilantes among others. However, for this paper, the state- non-state taxonomy is 
preferred to the formal-informal taxonomy because some non-state security 
arrangements are quite formal in organisation, and not ad hoc in character.25
Much of the literature on security privatization in Africa has tended to focus on 
  
                                                          
24 ibid 
25 Ibeanu & Momoh (2008), p.15 
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the activities of private military and commercial private security companies, with little 
on the non-commercial, non-state private actors. Yet, in many developing countries, 
these systems are the primary providers of justice and security to the poor.26
PMCs and PSCs consist of individuals and organisations structured along 
corporate lines and providing services independent of the state,
   
27 with PMCs primarily 
offering services of a military nature to organisations and states, whilst PSCs primarily 
provide security services to individuals and organisations on a commercial basis. The 
activities of the more combat-oriented PMCs in Africa, particularly in relation to the 
various natural resource conflicts on the continent are controversial, with arguments 
that they exacerbate violence in conflict areas, commit human rights abuses and are 
basically modern-day mercenaries.28
Such concerns notwithstanding, PMCs can play a positive role in contributing to 
security, particularly in conflict zones through such activities as de-mining and the 
provision of security to international and humanitarian organisations, including the 
United Nations.
 The activities of the now defunct Executive 
Outcomes in Angola and Blackwater USA in Iraq are frequently cited to support this 
argument.  
29 In countries not involved in active conflict, they are mainly involved 
in security sector reform. In Nigeria, the American PMC, Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI) has trained the Nigerian armed forces in peacekeeping 
operations and is currently assisting in its reform,30
                                                          
26 Olonisakin, et al (2009), p.11 
 whilst another American PMC, 
DynCorp International, is presently involved in rebuilding the Liberian armed forces. 
Much less controversial are the activities of PSCs, both local and international, which 
are more defensive and involve guarding services, escorts, protection of cash in transit 
27 Gumedze (2007), p .4 
28 Musah(2000), p. 107 
29 Wright & Brooke (2007) 
30 Ibeanu & Momoh (2008), p. 32 
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and alarm response among others.31 Some of the activities of PSCs, however, sometimes 
result in human rights abuses.32
Traditional forms of security provisioning, exercised through the institutions of 
chieftaincy, existed in African states before the colonialists set foot on the continent and 
attempted to either destroy these systems or curtail the power of chiefs.
  
33 In the Ashanti 
kingdom of Ghana, the Akwansrafo were wardens who patrolled trade routes and 
ensured the safety of travelers,34 whilst the Asafo companies were a well organized form 
of native army made up of advance guards (twafo), a main fighting body (adonten) and a 
rear guard (kyidom).35  The gyaase were the King’s bodyguards under command of the 
gyaasehene.36
Following independence and for two periods in its political history, the state of 
Ghana has sought to increase its hegemony by eliminating the authority of traditional 
leaders and replacing traditional institutions with local administrative units. The first 
instance was in the 1950s under the country’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, who 
sought to promote a unified state and expand the authority of the state by curtailing the 
powers of chieftaincy institutions.
  
37 The second period was during the military regime 
of Jerry Rawlings from 1981-1992, where the regime formed various organisations such 
as Peoples Defense Committees and National Defense Committees in an attempt to 
reform local level governance and encourage grassroots participation. These groups 
were hostile to traditional leaders and traditional authority.38
The 1992 Constitution of the country acknowledges the importance of the 
institution of chieftaincy, and provides for chiefs to mobilize communal labor and have 
   
                                                          
31 Kirunda (2008), p.11  
32 Alao (2002), p. 47 
33 Mamdani, p.53  
34 Tankebe (2008), p.68 
35 Arthur & Rowe (2009) 
36 ibid 
37 York (no date), p.8 
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sole authority over customary rites within their communities.39 They are thus law-
makers with respect to customary law and provisions in their communities, leading 
essentially to two parallel entities in the country in the realm of laws, viz, the state and 
traditional institutions. The state has also tried to exert influence over chiefs by 
requiring them to be officially gazetted before they can be officially recognized and join 
the various Regional Houses and National House of Chiefs. Such attempts 
notwithstanding, chiefs in the country and African states had and still continue to 
exercise significant authority in the security and justice sectors of their communities.40
Communal security arrangements are another form of security provisioning that 
exist in many African states, for example Rwanda and Uganda.
 
41 Such communal, 
usually non-commercial security systems are mainly found at the local community 
levels and usually provide security not for profit, but on an exclusionary basis for 
political and broader socio-economic reasons, and often in response to the same 
exclusionary provision of security that stimulates the commercial security market.42
Poor people, particularly in urban locales, often live on the margins of illegality 
in society in terms of illegal acquisition of housing, non-payment of taxes, etc. 
Consequently, they are unable or unwilling to approach formal state institutions to seek 
security and justice to avoid drawing attention to themselves. They therefore tend to 
rely on such community based systems. In Alexandria, Egypt, for instance, about 68% 
of the city’s population live in squatter settlements built informally in violation of 
building regulations.
  
43
                                                                                                                                                                                           
38 ibid, p.9 
 This makes squatters vulnerable to police action and 
exploitation, and consequently unwilling to approach state institutions for their security 
and justice needs. Communal systems include vigilante groups, neighborhood watch 
39 Ministry of Justice (2005) 
40 York  (no date), p. 12 
41 Baker & Scheye (no date), p. 2 
42 Bourne (2002), p. 18 
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committees and community policing.  
Some problems are however associated with some of these community security 
arrangements, including mob actions, and the criminal activities of some groups that 
mutate from community security provision to activities like armed robbery, 
kidnappings and extortion.44 Such problems notwithstanding, the majority of poor 
people still see such systems as offering practical solutions and consequently patronize 
their services. For example, in Sierra Leone, justice and security shortfalls, as well as the 
negative perception of the justice system by the poor, have led to the formation of 
community-level self-help patrols comprising young people.45
Apart from the above groups and mechanisms, civil society organisations and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also play a vital role in the provision of 
security through such activities as human rights advocacy, research, peace building and 
conflict mediation, and dispute resolution, particularly in the justice sectors. 
 
It should be stated here that whilst the above mentioned groups do not usually 
have any links to the state, some, such as the Hisbah religious organisation that 
operates in northern Nigeria are state-sponsored arrangements. Overall, however, state 
actors tend to be more hostile to informal security systems than they are to informal 
justice systems, perceiving the former as undermining the monopoly of the use of force 
by the state.46
                                                                                                                                                                                           
43 Olonisakin et al (2009), p.14 
 Despite some of the problems associated with security provision by these 
non-state mechanisms in developing countries, due to the inability or unwillingness of 
the formal state security systems to provide equitable security to all, a majority of 
citizens turn to these non-state mechanisms, which are seen as largely legitimate, to 
meet their security and justice needs. 
44 Ibeanu & Momoh (2008), p. 52 
45 Ismail & Hendrickson (2009), p.7 
46 ibid 
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Legal Framework of Private Security Provision 
In Ghana, Section 38 of Act 350 (1970) of the Ghana Police Service Act regulates the 
activities of private security organisations. According to the Act, a private security 
organisation is any organisation ‘which undertakes private investigations as to facts …, 
or which performs services of watching, guarding, patrolling …, but does not include 
the Police Service, Prisons Service or the Armed Forces of Ghana’.47 Two additional 
legal instruments were passed by the state to streamline the conduct and activities of 
these organisations. These are Legislative Instruments 1571 of 1992 and 1579 of 1994.48 
These legal instruments govern the activities of registered, commercial private security 
organisations, of which according to the Association of Private Security Organisations 
of Ghana (APSOG), there are over 350, many of which are not licensed to operate.49
Effective private security should be accountable to and serve the needs of users 
without having negative consequences on either the users or other members of the 
community, and neither should it expose providers, especially employees, to 
unacceptable risks. Thus, its provision would demand that the actors are accountable to 
the state and citizens, and this can be achieved through a system of effective state 
regulatory and oversight mechanism,
 No 
legal instrument, however, exists in the country for the regulation of other forms of 
private security provisioning, such as neighborhood watch committees, or the activities 
of non-governmental organisations that are involved in the security sector.  
50
 
 as well as working in cooperation with the state. 
The next chapter details how the study was carried out.  
                                                          
47 Aning (2006), p. 8 
48 Aning & Lartey (no date), p. 19 
49 ibid, p.18 
50 Richards & Smith (2007), p. 2 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter covers the research methodology that was employed for the study. The 
methodology was carved out to meet the research objectives and address data-
gathering problems imminent in research of this nature in the country. The study was 
basically exploratory and the strategy employed was not restrictive; processes and 
procedures were modified as the research progressed, to achieve the research 
objectives. The major components of this chapter are the research population, sampling 
technique and selection, data sources and research instruments, and data collection 
process. 
 
Population 
The population of study consisted of land-guards, neighborhood watch committees, 
chiefs and traditional leaders, commercial private security companies, members of the 
general population resident in target communities and identified experts in the country 
in the field of peace and security. The indented terms will be explained later in the 
paper. Primary data was collected from two towns in the country, the capital Accra 
which is urban, and Tamale, a semi-urban town in the northern part of the country, 
where there is a simmering conflict over chieftaincy.  Accra was chosen because of its 
urban characteristics, the presence of a great number of PSCs, the high reported cases of 
the activities of land-guards, and the presence of the headquarters of a significant 
number of civil society organisations. Tamale was also chosen because of its semi-urban 
characteristics and the fact that there is a latent chieftaincy conflict in the region, with 
consequent complex effects and dynamics on security in the town.  
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The number of participants interviewed was 102. The breakdown is as follows; 2 
chiefs and traditional leaders (1 in Tamale metropolis and the other in Adoteiman, a 
village located on the outskirts of Accra), 25 neighborhood watch committee members 
(18 in Accra and 7 in Tamale), 16 employees of commercial private security companies( 
4 each from 4 different companies, 3 based in Accra and 1 in Tamale), 16 land-guards in 
Accra, 40 members of the general population residing in the communities in which the 
study was carried out (30 in Accra and 10 in Tamale) and 3 experts in field of peace and 
security in the country. They were interviewed about their activities, clients and the 
services they offered and their views about security in the country. Additionally, the 
members of the general public were questioned about their security needs, their views 
on security in their communities and the activities of the aforementioned actors. In 
Accra, the research was carried out in the following suburbs; Nima-Mamobi (a slum 
area), Adoteiman, Lashibi (a middle-class community with a number of gated 
communities) and Madina. In Tamale, the suburbs were Kalpohini, Vittin, and Zogbeli.  
 
Sampling Technique and Selection  
The sample selection was based on the following criteria: 
 The groups selected were those that provided services related to issues of safety, 
security and justice to individuals and communities. 
 Individuals or residents came from communities in which the groups were located 
or carried out their activities. 
 The major limitation of this sampling technique was the subjective nature of the 
choice of respondents. Additionally, for a study of this nature, the number of identified 
subjects could have been higher. However, since this study was limited specifically to 
non-state actors that perform security and justice functions in the country, the relatively 
small number of 102 participants was considered adequate, as in investigating a specific 
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group of people, a large sample is not necessarily required to make generalise the 
findings to the larger group.51
 To limit subjectivity in sampling, the residents interviewed had to have stayed in 
the community for at least a year, whilst members of the land-guards, neighborhood 
watch committees and commercial private security organisations had to be residents of 
the communities in the case of the neighborhood watch committees, and formal 
employees in the case of commercial private security organisations. In the particular 
case of land-guards, they also had to subscribe to the group norms and ethos.  
  
       Objectivity, reliability and validity are necessary to ensure quality in any research, 
and the study was designed with these in mind. Objectivity was ensured through an 
unbiased assessment of the activities, coupled with the fact that the assessments and 
conclusions were drawn from both primary data gathered and available secondary 
data. To achieve validity, some writers advocate triangulation,52
 
 thus data and method 
triangulation were employed in the study. To ensure external validity, the findings of 
the study are applicable only to the identified non-state actors in Ghana. Due to the 
demographic and socio-economic similarities of towns and villages in the country, the 
results from this study can be extrapolated to most parts of the country. Data and 
method triangulation were also employed to achieve external validity. 
 Data Sources 
Primary and secondary data were used for the study. Primary data was collected from 
respondents from the identified non-state actors, the three security experts in the 
country, and the general public, whilst secondary data was collected from sources such 
as books, peer reviewed articles, magazines, newspapers and the internet. The emphasis 
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was however on interviews and questionnaires as it is recognized that they can elicit 
personal and individual meanings to research questions.53 Non-structured interviewing 
in particular is considered valuable where the research area or subject matter is 
considered sensitive or complicated,54
The search for literature on the research topic involved searching for literature on 
security and justice in general, private security provisioning in Ghana and Africa, and 
mechanisms employed by a Ghanaians to address their security, safety and justice 
concerns. A search was also made for community-based and traditional security and 
justice arrangements employed in various countries, particularly in Africa.  
 as was the case in this study. 
          
Research Instruments 
King’s College Consent Form 
Participants were first briefed about the purpose of the research and given an 
explanation about the research aims and objectives. They were also informed that their 
confidentiality and anonymity would be guaranteed, and that they could withdraw 
from the study at anytime if they so wished, and that whatever information they gave 
was going to be protected in accordance with the United Kingdom’s Data Protection 
Act 1998. Following this, willing participants then signed the consent form before the 
interviews and questionnaires were administered. 
 
Questionnaires and Interview Guides 
Questionnaires were used to gather quantitative primary data from residents and the 
general population as well as some unit committee members in target communities. 
Both structured and unstructured questions were used. The unstructured questions 
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were used to give the respondents the chance to provide their own responses whilst at 
the same time enabling the rapid collection of significant amounts of relevant data. 
Interview guides were used to conduct interviews of the experts, leaders of unit 
watch committees and land-guards, chiefs as well as employees of commercial private 
security companies. The interviews were used to collect qualitative primary data, and to 
elicit in-depth information and explanations to the research questions. Specific 
questions were asked for each category based on the ability to generate quality and 
appropriate answers. Some questions were repeated across all groups, to authenticate 
answers given by one sample group, by another sample group. An example is a 
question about the services that groups provided and that residents received. This 
question was asked in the interviews and questionnaires for all groups, with the aim of 
authenticating the services that groups said they provided, with the services that 
residents said they received. Generally, the questions for both the interviews and 
questionnaires were carefully framed since answers given to questions depend on how 
the questions are asked.  
Data Collection Process 
The data collection process took place over a three week period from 7th June 2009 to 
27th June 2009. The processes involved in the process included interview and 
questionnaire design and administration. 
 
Questionnaire and Interview Design 
A questionnaire was designed for the general population as well as unit committee 
members. Seven of the questionnaires were pre-tested to ascertain their appropriateness 
or otherwise. The pre-testing was carried out among Ghanaian residents in London. 
The questionnaires were all coded to facilitate field control. This enabled the researcher 
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to grant anonymity to the respondents while simultaneously achieving the 
identification process for follow up interviews and clarifications where it became 
necessary. The interview guides for the other groups were also pre-tested. Anomalies 
and ambiguities detected at this stage were rectified before the actual data gathering 
process commenced. 
Questionnaire and Interview Administration 
The questionnaires were distributed to the various respondents in the communities. The 
first ports of call were the leadership of the neighborhood watch committees, 
commercial private security organisations and land-guards. At each location, the 
questionnaires were given to identified participants whilst dates for interviews were 
arranged with interview participants. It took an average of two weeks to conduct the 
interviews and one week to get the questionnaires completed. All participants used in 
the study were assured of confidentiality and anonymity in the write up of the research 
findings. 
The interviews were used to gain deeper insight into specific issues bordering on 
organisation, recruitment and training and services offered. None of the interviews 
conducted were audio recorded. Problems encountered during this stage were the slow 
response rates, with respondents to questionnaires not keeping to promised collection 
dates. This made the exercise more expensive than anticipated.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the study. It begins with an outline of the groups 
that were identified, and for each group, their membership, organisation and 
recruitment process are outlined. This is followed by an examination of their activities 
or the services they provide, who their clients are, and the perception of members of the 
general public about their activities.  
 
Identified Non-State Security Actors 
The study identified the following as the main non-state actors providing security 
services in the country; PMCs and PSCs, community groups like neighborhood watch 
committees, watchmen, land-guards, traditional organisations like the Nachimba in 
Tamale, ‘machomen’ or thugs for hire, and NGOs and civil society organisations 
involved in the security sector. 
 
PSCs and PMCs 
There are two main types of private security organisations in the country; commercial 
private security companies that operate in mainly urban areas of the country, and 
private military companies that occasionally provide training to some security agencies. 
Private security companies operate in both towns, providing their services for a fee, 
with the amount that clients pay varying based on the services provided and the level 
of professionalism of companies. A majority of these companies are locally owned and 
operated. Others, particularly in Accra and other big, urban towns are international 
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companies such as G4S International. A third category involves partnerships between 
Ghanaians and expatriates. In general however, two main types of private security 
agencies operate in Ghana, one operated by public institutions such as universities that 
recruit and train personnel to serve their security needs, and the second being the 
commercial, profit-companies that recruit and dispatch employees to serve the needs of 
clients.55
Recruitment is carried out mainly through advertisements in local media, though 
occasionally managerial positions for some international companies are advertised in 
international media. For the majority of positions advertised locally for guards, the 
basic requirements are Ghanaian citizenship, evidence of a good character, and the 
possession of a basic level of education such as Basic Education Certificate 
Examinations (BECE) qualification. Standards however vary among different 
companies based on different levels of professionalism and the type of services 
provided. Generally though, training is limited, but ranges from physical training, to 
the correct use of radio communications equipment, to specialized training like dog-
handling (K-9) procedures. More sophisticated training includes installation, manning 
and operation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) equipment, and rapid alarm response. 
   
The remuneration of staff is based on educational qualifications and expertise, 
with international companies paying their employees slightly higher than local 
companies, though the level of remuneration is generally low. A majority of the trainers 
are of military and police backgrounds, usually retired Ghanaian and expatriate army 
and police officers. Very limited vetting is conducted on the background of employees, 
and this sometimes has negative repercussions as some guards with criminal 
backgrounds are recruited, making them security risks rather than solutions.  
The services generally provided by these organisations are manned guarding of 
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premises, escort for goods and cash in transit, K-9 response, manned alarm response, 
the operation of CCTV, theft/loss prevention in retail organisations, and patrolling of 
residential areas amongst others. Clients are usually banks, shops and malls, 
commercial housing estates and private residences. The state also employs the services 
of some of these organisations at some key locations such as airports and seaports, oil 
refineries and the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The equipment usually employed include vehicles for patrolling and cash-in-
transit services, communications equipment such as radios (though some organisations 
depend on commercial cellular phones) and CCTV equipment and accoutrements. 
Employees are not permitted by law to carry arms in performing their duties, and this 
makes them rather ineffective in situations where they have to confront armed 
criminals. Guards do not have the special powers of arrest that the police have, but as 
individuals or groups, can effect a citizen’s arrest in accordance with the law. Their 
supervisors, usually located in an operations room off-site, are the first port of call for 
reporting incidents. Supervisors may in turn get in touch with the police for assistance 
where necessary. This assists the police by providing them with information about 
security-related incidents, though their reaction time to such incidents is usually 
reduced.   
Companies wholly and solely administer themselves, but are required by law to 
be registered before operating, and the Ministry of the Interior has the responsibility of 
monitoring and regulating their activities. Additionally, companies are expected to 
register with the Association of Private Security Organisations in Ghana (APSOG), an 
umbrella organisation of all private security organisations in the country. Registration 
in both cases is however low, with low minimal supervision by the Ministry of the 
Interior. This has resulted in considerable numbers of companies operating without 
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proper clearance and oversight.56 Monitoring of registered companies by the Interior 
Ministry has basically been reduced to the yearly granting of renewal licenses after the 
payment of renewal fees. These situations combine to allow unprofessional activities 
and the delivery of low quality services by some of these companies, whether legally 
registered or not. These concerns have been articulated by APSOG, which has called on 
the government to streamline the activities of PSCs in the country, as some of them 
posed a threat to national security.57
There are varying levels of cooperation and collaboration between the state 
security and law enforcement agencies and some of these organisations, as well as 
between the organisations. Those deployed at critical national infrastructure sites like 
airports and seaports would usually be first respondents to incidents at these sites, and 
therefore work closely with state security agencies. Plans are advanced to establish a 
hotline between such companies and the Police Headquarters Operations Room in 
Accra, which would increase the level of interaction and collaboration. Fewer PSCs 
operate in Tamale, and these are all local, with their services limited to manned 
guarding of premises and the prevention of theft in shops and retails stores. 
  
On a lesser scale, some individuals and organisations employ individuals, 
usually on an informal basis, called ‘watchmen,’ to guard their premises particularly at 
night and when residents are away from homes. Watchmen serve mainly to prevent 
theft and burglary. They have no formal training, and their recruitment is based on 
criteria determined by the employers. Their services are usually paid for by their 
employers, though some have informal arrangements such as the provision of 
accommodation, feeding and related benefits in exchange for their services. Those not 
usually paid cash for their services are sometimes referred to as ‘house-boys’, and in 
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addition to guarding duties, usually perform other care taking duties such as gardening 
and running errands. Watchmen are usually unarmed, though in some cases, some 
keep weapons such as cutlasses, bows and arrows and even shot-guns, depending on 
their assessment of the level of threat they face, for self-defense as well as the defense of 
property at the premises they work.   
PMCs activities in the country have been much more limited. The United States’ 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative involving some African countries, includes 
Ghana.58
 
 Some of the security agencies, particularly the armed forces, have been 
engaged in some collaborative activities with the United States. Some of such 
collaborations have been the Joint Combined Exercises and Training (JCET), and the 
African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) programmes. These 
programmes have been delivered by American PMCs such as MPRI, as part of US 
military assistance to the country. Such programmes assist Ghanaian security agencies 
in technical areas such as counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations and 
training, though the focus has been on these hard, narrower aspects of security, leaving 
out broader issues entailed in security provision such as human rights training.   
Neighborhood Watch Committees (NWC) 
These are formally organized groups of residents in particular communities or 
neighborhoods, who watch out for criminals and any suspicious behavior in the area, 
arresting and reporting suspects to the police and consequently providing communal 
security. They usually patrol their communities at night. The phenomenon is 
widespread in the country and is actively encouraged by the police as a way of 
increasing cooperation and fostering working relations with communities. NWCs 
operate in both locations covered by the study. Membership is voluntary, and is usually 
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made up of residents, particularly the youth, who are perceived to be of good character. 
Some other potential members are identified by opinion leaders in the communities, 
like imams of mosques, who approach such potential members and encourage them to 
join.  
The neighborhoods are divided into zones, with a watch committee made up of 
about 30 members in each zone. Leaders are selected by members, and selection is 
usually based on characteristics like bravery and the ability to mobilize youth and 
resources. Contrary to a common perception in some existing literature that members 
are usually unemployed youth, a significant number of members are employed in 
regular jobs during the day, such as teaching and trading. Some members are women, 
and they are primarily used to gather information about criminal activities in the 
community. In some communities in Accra, membership is limited to people born and 
bred in the community, as there is a perception that residents who settle in such 
communities from other parts of the country are usually those who join criminal gangs. 
There is no formal training offered to members, although they usually organize 
‘keep fit’ physical activities, especially during the weekends. Sticks, cutlasses, torches 
and cellular phones are the primary tools employed for the apprehension of suspected 
criminals and the protection of members. The details of members and leaders are given 
to the police, usually with pictures of all members and phone numbers of the leaders. 
Groups usually have an assembly point where they meet or can be found, 
making it easy for residents to contact them for assistance and report criminal activities. 
Their activities are dependent on the security concerns of residents, which vary from 
theft and armed robbery to drug dealing and usage, particularly the smoking of Indian 
hemp. Although groups engage in day and night patrolling, it is done mostly at night, 
driving away drug dealers and peddlers, and preventing theft and armed robbery. In 
carrying out their activities, physical violence is sometimes employed when in their 
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opinion it is necessary, with the level of violence dependent on perceived level of threat. 
Some members sometimes get injured when dealing with violent suspects, whilst at 
other times, they employ vigilante violence against suspects, some of who are innocent.  
The groups also frequently provide dispute resolution, mediation and arbitration 
services within their communities, particularly in cases involving residents as suspects, 
and as much as possible, they involve family members of victims and suspects in these 
processes. In communities with negative criminal reputations, such as the suburb of 
Nima-Mamobi, this mediation is usually done as an attempt to amicably resolve issues 
and consequently improve upon the negative image of the community. Members are 
not paid and do not charge for services provided, though some communities levy 
charges for administrative activities, whilst in other communities, grateful members as 
well as opinion leaders occasionally give material and financial support to the groups. 
Nevertheless, this is not a guaranteed source of income or support.   
Compared to other non-state security mechanisms, there is a greater degree of 
cooperation and collaboration between this mechanism of security provision and the 
police and security agencies, particularly with regards to the sharing of information, 
with police permission necessary before committees can operate. This is partly because 
the police aim to establish a greater support base within communities to help identify 
criminals and criminal trends in order to proactively respond to them, as well as 
generate a positive image with the public,59 and this mechanism offers an entry point 
into communities. In line with this objective, the Police Administration launched a 
Community Policing Unit in 2002 to bridge the communication and interaction gap 
between the police and the communities they serve.60
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 Consequently, the police 
routinely advise the committee leadership on crime prevention strategies and issues of 
60 ibid 
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mutual interest, though they do not get involved in the administration of the watch 
committees.  
There is also considerable collaboration between committees from different 
zones in a particular community, as well as with committees from other suburbs of the 
towns and cities, particularly in Accra, to the extent that joint patrols and operations are 
sometimes carried out. For example, there is a significant level of collaboration between 
the committee members in Nima-Mamobi and those in Madina, another suburb of 
Accra.61
Related to these community mechanisms is a phenomenon where neighbors and 
family members, particularly in low-income neighborhoods, act as guardians over 
households, particularly in the absence of household members. This is particularly 
common in ‘compound-houses,’ where families live in single housing units that contain 
several individual rooms, but with shared facilities such as kitchens and bathrooms. 
Such services are mutually offered as and when the need arises, in the spirit of good 
neighborliness. 
 Such collaboration usually takes the form of information sharing and joint 
patrols, particularly when the spate of crime in a particular area is so high that the local 
watch committee is overwhelmed and needs support and backup from other 
committees. In other instances, the police seek assistance from them in locating and 
apprehending criminal suspects.   
 
Traditional Systems  
Despite the limited role that the constitution gives them, traditional authorities, 
particularly chiefs, play an important role in the provision of security and 
administration of justice in the country. Within the Greater Accra region, in Adoteiman, 
a village on the outskirts of Accra, there operates a traditional system of security 
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provision with similarities to the NWC concept in terms of membership criteria and 
activities, with the major difference being found in the source of authority. In this case, 
the chief is the overall undisputed leader, whereas for NWCs the choice of leadership 
involves a consensus by members. Another major difference is that, being on the 
outskirts of the city, apart from the common security issues of theft and armed robbery, 
the community has to frequently deal with the activities of land-guards in the village, 
and this sometimes results in heavy clashes with them. Consequently, the traditional 
groups here are armed with more deadly weapons like cutlasses and machetes, and 
even shotguns.  
Also, although membership is voluntary, the members report to the chief, and 
the leadership is appointed by the chief, thus there is a greater influence of traditional 
systems of authority on their activities, and this is even more so with regards to the 
resolution of disputes in the community. However, with regards to dispute resolution, 
although there is a common perception that community justice delivery is generally 
faster, in some cases, they take longer to resolve, partly because the investigative 
mechanisms of the traditional authorities are not as efficient and professional as the 
police. This sometimes leads to the miscarriage of justice.  
Traditional authority influence on security is more pervasive and deeper in 
Tamale, which is the capital of the Northern Region of Ghana and one of the 
paramountcies of the Dagbon traditional area. Before proceeding, it is important to note 
that there is an ongoing chieftaincy conflict in this area, involving succession to position 
of the Yaa Naa’s.62
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 Two factions are involved in this; the Abudu and the Andani factions, 
and the conflict resulted in the murder in 2002 of the Yaa Naa and some of his followers. 
Pending the resolution of this conflict, a regent has been installed to run the affairs of 
the traditional area in an acting capacity. 
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In Tamale, in addition to neighborhood watch committees, there exists an older 
and more traditional community security arrangement, known as the Nachimba (youth) 
organisation, which operates under the authority of chiefs. Traditionally, the Tamale 
paramountcy is divided into seven sub-paramountcies; Gulpkegu, Zogbeli, Dakpema, 
Bamvim, Lamashegu, Choggu and Woreshee, each with a chief, whilst the Yaa-Naa is the 
overlord of the Dagbon traditional area and is based in Yendi, the traditional capital.  
Each sub-paramount area has a Nachimba group, and membership is open to only 
male residents of the area between the ages of 20 and 40 years who are of good 
character. Membership is voluntary. The leader of each group, called the Nachinaa, is 
not elected but is appointed by the respective chiefs of each area, to whom they are 
accountable. Appointment of the Nachinaa is usually based on competence, character 
and an ability to mobilize, organize and control the youth in the area.    
The activities of the Nachimba include the conduct of night patrols in their 
respective communities, the arrest of suspects, debt collection, settlement of minor land 
disputes, and provision of security and protection for chiefs. They also resolve conflicts 
between members of the community and engage in other justice-related activities like 
mediation and arbitration of domestic issues. In dealing with disputes, cases that are 
deemed to be of a serious nature are referred to the chief, and where the chief feels that 
a case is too complex or serious for him to deal with, such cases are referred to the 
police.63 Murder and rape cases are however always referred straight to the police. Also, 
chiefs sometimes withdraw civil cases involving residents that are pending before 
formal justice systems, usually at the request of complainants or when they feel they 
can resolve such cases more amicably.64
Force and physical violence were previously employed by the youth to arrest 
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suspects and settle cases, and this resulted in a lot of residents referring their problems 
and disputes to the police rather than the traditional authorities, but that practice was 
officially outlawed by the chiefs in 2004.65
No particular training is given to members, apart from the Nachinaa who receives 
instructions periodically from the chief about specific duties.  Most cases involving 
young people are handled by the Nachinaa, and when a case involving a young person 
is referred to the chief, it is the parents or guardians of the person who appears before 
the chief, since traditionally, a young person cannot appear before a chief to answer 
questions.  
 However, physical violence is still sometimes 
employed unofficially to arrest suspects, though the accepted practice is to invite 
suspects to either the Nachinaa’s place or the chief’s palace. The services are provided to 
every resident in the community, irrespective of ethnic origin. Different ethnic groups 
from other parts of the country, as well as from different countries in the sub-region like 
Burkina Faso, who are resident in the town have their own chiefs, who sometimes 
resolve disputes amongst members. These other non-indigenous chiefs also collaborate 
with the indigenous chiefs of the various communities in which their members reside, 
to resolve disputes involving residents of their ethnic groups.  
There is collaboration with the police through the chiefs, as well as between the 
youth groups of the different paramountcies, especially when criminal activities involve 
residents from different areas, or when suspects or complainants move from one 
locality to another. The youth groups do not carry any special equipment apart from 
items like torchlights for night patrols and privately owned cell phones. On being 
appointed by the chief however, the Nachinaa is given a traditional whip as a symbol of 
the authority vested in him.        
Members do not receive any payment for their services, but association with the 
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chief enables the Nachinaa to benefit from patronage and some privileges associated 
with access to the chief. This arrangement in Tamale is replicated through other towns 
and villages in the northern region of Ghana. 
 
Land-guards 
The phenomenon of land-guards in the country is a relatively recent one, and public 
perceptions about it are generally ambivalent. Basically, land-guards are individuals 
and groups who are hired by citizens to guard and secure either land or landed 
property. They are extralegal groups and settle private disputes, usually by resort to 
violence and intimidation. The practice is more prevalent in big urban centers than in 
smaller towns and communities, with the research revealing that land-guards operate 
in Accra but not in Tamale.  
The land-guards in Accra vary in character and level of organisation. 
Membership criteria also vary depending on the nature and level of organisation, but 
generally include courage, bravery and hard-work, and members generally hail from 
particular areas, namely Nima-Mamobi, Teshie-Nungua, Lashibi, Mallam, Kasoa, Madina 
and Ashaiman, which are generally low-income suburbs of the city. Though members are 
typically residents of suburbs in which groups are located, some groups have non-
resident members, and in such cases, other criteria such as sympathy to the aims of the 
group, or affiliation through friendship or kinship with group members are taken into 
consideration. The background of members is also diverse depending on the group, 
ranging from the illiterate and unemployed, to people employed in vocations like 
carpentry and masonry, and to serving as well as retired personnel of the various state 
security agencies. Some groups have initiation rituals such as swearing of oaths of 
allegiance, and blood-letting ceremonies, whilst a majority have less colorful rituals. 
Group leaders are usually chosen based on criteria such as charisma, influence and 
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networks, and the ability to get ‘jobs.’ The more organized groups have group norms, 
and where a group member goes against such norms, they are either suspended or 
expelled. 
Clients of land-guards are individuals with land or landed property, chiefs with 
custodial lands, real estate developers and building contractors. They are usually 
involved in contestation over ownership of land or property, a situation prevalent in the 
country due to multiple sales of land by landowners who exploit lapses in the land 
administration process. 
Their services include physical protection of land and property, and the 
prevention of access to the site of their clients by competing parties. In general however, 
they would perform whatever tasks their clients demand, and this varies depending on 
whether the client is an individual with a parcel of land to protect, or a chief or an 
organisation with vested interest in a piece of land. For individuals, they usually 
provide the services until a building project is completed, whilst for chiefs or 
commercial real estate developers, their services are usually employed until a legal case 
is determined or a piece of land or property is legally documented.  
Members of the groups do not have any formal training or recruitment process, 
though many engage in physical training and bodybuilding exercises, and those with 
illegal access to weapons, particularly locally manufactured guns and pistols train in 
their use. There is no collaboration with state security agencies, though inter-group 
collaboration exists, as well as some collaboration with influential members of their 
communities in some cases. Some groups also have networks in other suburbs of Accra, 
and call for assistance when necessary.  
Before undertaking operations for clients in any area, groups usually find out if 
other groups are operating in that area or on the piece of land in dispute. If another 
group is involved and the two groups are on good terms or part of a network, they try 
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to resolve the dispute between their clients amicably, failing which one group would 
refuse to take on the job. This is done so as not to upset inter-group dynamics in 
particular networks. Some of the clients also engage the services of law firms and 
surveyors, and where this is the case, such firms work with or advise the land-guards. 
Some group members ask for ‘spiritual protection’ from pastors and imams before 
carrying out some tasks, particularly if there is a high likelihood of a confrontation with 
other groups or people. Though they do not generally collaborate with the state security 
and law enforcement agencies, the sometimes assist with information, particularly 
regarding investigations, and this cooperation is usually out of fear of retribution for 
illegal activities, rather than voluntary assistance.  
It should be noted, however, that not all groups always resort to violence in the 
performance of their duties, they sometimes arbitrate in land disputes between clients, 
and as previously stated, may sometimes refuse to take on some jobs if it would involve 
confrontation with other groups. In some cases, the guards arrest suspects and hand 
them over to the police. Most of the guards do not live in the areas where work as 
guards; they go to perform their duties at these sites, usually on the outskirts of Accra 
where a significant amount of building construction is ongoing. Thus, they either 
commute daily to the sites or stay at the sites for protracted periods until the property is 
secured or any litigation resolved. 
Whilst the notion of protection of one’s property by whatever legal means 
necessary is not contested, it is the means by which the land-guards perform their 
duties which is controversial. This is because a lot of physical violence is employed, and 
their regular tools and accoutrements include pickaxes, cutlasses, cudgels, crowbars 
and other improvised equipment, which are sometimes used to pull down structures. 
Some groups which are better organized have weapons like shotguns and vehicles to 
transport their members to group sites. Also, some chiefs and clients with registered 
  
41 
arms sometimes give these to the guards to use, although the practice is illegal. Due to 
the violence, casualties and insecurity caused by their activities, they have been 
declared illegal and their activities criminalized by the state. That notwithstanding, 
people still patronize their services, and their continued existence suggests that they 
have a significant amount of utility.  
A related phenomenon to ‘land-guardism’ which however does not involve the 
violence usually associated with land-guards involves poor people who are unable to 
find accommodation in the city, being allowed by property owners to occupy their 
vacant properties, either by living in their completed or uncompleted but unoccupied 
buildings, or occupying makeshift structures on the premises for free. In exchange for 
this, the occupants provide security by their presence, and in some cases are paid a 
monthly allowance by property owners. This form of guarding is not as controversial as 
land-guards, and is also more widespread throughout the country. 
 
NGOs and Civil Society Groups 
Despite the limited number of experts and civil society organisations interested in the 
field of security, and with the requisite expertise,66 a number of local and international 
NGOs and civil society groups play a significant role in the security of the country. 
They are primarily involved in research, conflict management, human rights campaigns 
and dispute resolution, with some local organisations collaborating with parliament on 
security sector governance.67
Organisations such as the West African Network for Peace (WANEP), an Accra-
based West African network of civil society organisations involved in peace building, 
has played, and continues to play significant mediation roles in two ongoing conflicts in 
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the northern part of the country, in Bawku and Dagbon traditional area. Others such as 
Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) are actively 
involved in negotiations and conflict resolution between multinational companies 
operating in mining areas, and the residents of such communities in which the 
operations take place and who suffer environmental degradation and other negative 
socio-economic impacts of mining.68
Due to the high cost of access to legal services in the formalized court systems, as 
well as a general lack of understanding of court rules and procedures, civil society 
organisations such as the Ghana Legal Aid Board and private organisations like the 
Legal Resources Center play an important role in providing legal representation to the 
public, particularly the poor. The coverage area of their activities however is not 
nationwide, with low representation in rural areas whilst access to justice is 
geographically skewed to favor areas of high economic activity rather than high 
population density.
  
69
Other key national and international NGOs and civil society organisations that 
directly and indirectly influence and contribute to security thinking and practice in the 
country through training, seminars and workshops include the African Security Sector 
Network, African Security Dialogue and Research, the Ghana Center for Democratic 
Development and West African Action Network on Small Arms. 
  
 
Ad-hoc Groups and ‘Macho-men’  
There are other ad-hoc and transient groups that form in response to specific situations, 
such as villagers in some parts of the country mobilizing on a temporary basis to deal 
with periodic theft and cattle rustling by nomadic Fulani herdsmen from the Sahel 
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region of West Africa. Another common group of non-state security actors are referred 
to as ‘macho-men.’ These are individuals, usually young men, who are used by citizens 
and particularly politicians and political party functionaries, to perform duties along 
party lines. They are privately organized and operate outside the law, with their 
membership drawn from political parties. Their main activities include mainly 
protecting prominent members of their respective political parties against perceived 
threats, organizing escorts and receptions for visiting party functionaries, intimidating 
voters during elections and settling personal disputes and vendettas. They are often 
present at pre-election rallies of political parties, performing in essence ‘protection’ 
duties.  
Whilst in Accra, the research did not reveal any overtly political ‘macho-men,’ 
two such groups operate in Tamale and have been frequently used by the two main 
political parties in the country, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP). The ‘Azorka Boys’ are aligned to the NDC whilst the ‘Addow 
Boys’ are aligned to the NPP. These two groups are also aligned to the two factions 
involved in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, the Azorkas to the Andanis and the 
Addows to Abudus. These groups receive financial and material support from 
politicians, particularly for specific duties and activities, but this remuneration is not on 
a regular basis. In other instances, their services are procured by basically anybody with 
a grievance and the resources to pay for their services. Thus, some of these ‘macho-men’ 
perform similar duties to land-guards in some instances.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
What this chapter has shown is that the various non-state security actors in the country 
provide services that generally improve the security and perception of security among 
their clients and subjects. The mechanisms largely fill in security lapses and gaps in the 
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country. With the exception of the activities of ‘macho-men’ and some land-guards and 
PSCs, a majority of the general population see the activities of these groups as 
contributing positively to security in the country.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter analyses the roles and impacts of the activities of the identified non-state 
actors. This is first done for each group of actors, before an overall analysis of all the 
actors is done. The chapter then concludes with recommendations on how the state 
could benefit from utilizing some of the contributions and advantages offered by these 
groups, to improve upon overall security in the country. 
 
Roles and Impacts of Identified Non-State Security Actors  
The actors on the security terrain in the country can be broadly categorized into public 
and legal such as the police, public and illegal such as police officers and state security 
officials operating outside their legal mandate, private and legal such as registered 
PSCs, neighborhood watch committees and watchmen, and private and illegal, such as 
unlicensed PSCs, land-guards and ‘macho-men.’70
 
  
Traditional Systems 
The traditional forms of security provisioning, despite being largely relegated to the 
background, provide effective security solutions to a large constituency of Ghanaians 
dissatisfied with the formal security and justice systems. Chiefs play essential 
leadership roles, with responsibility for the safety, welfare and well-being of their 
subjects and communities. The Chieftaincy Act 759, passed by Parliament in 2008, gives 
traditional chiefs the power to mediate local matters and enforce customary tribal laws 
dealing with civil and non-criminal matters such as divorce, child custody, and 
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property disputes.71
Thus, though the constitution does not explicitly recognize traditional court 
institutions in criminal justice delivery, and limits the role of chiefs to mediation of 
customary disputes, nevertheless chiefs and traditional authorities continue to play an 
important role in security, and extend their jurisdiction beyond chieftaincy related 
matters to family and property disputes, divorce and child custody. The result is the 
existence of two parallel legal systems, a dominant state system based on inherited 
colonial laws and values, and a second system that reflects the values and customs of 
local people.   
 In the arena of justice delivery, traditional systems are able to 
provide culturally relevant resolutions to complex issues that involve witchcraft, taboos 
and other cultural norms and values which the formal courts are not equipped to deal 
with.  
Chiefs and traditional rulers are also frequently involved in the development of 
their communities, with the Asantehene for instance being proactive and showing its 
relevance by establishing an Educational Trust Fund to assist brilliant but needy 
students. Given their prominent role in society, it is thus little wonder that a lot of 
people continue to turn to traditional authorities for the resolution of their security and 
justice issues, especially in the face of rising crime, a corrupt and ineffective police 
service and a corrupt and slow judiciary characterized by culturally strange and ill-
understood practices.     
Apart from the community level, chiefs and traditional authorities also play an 
important role at the national level, particularly with regards to arbitration and 
reconciliation. The ongoing chieftaincy conflict in Dagbon is a case in point where 
traditional authority, through a Council of Eminent Chiefs, is actively engaged in a 
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process aimed at the amicable resolution of the conflict.  
These positive roles and contributions notwithstanding, traditional institutions 
in the country are sometimes a source of insecurity. There are numerous chieftaincy 
disputes in the country.  Over the years, chieftaincy systems in the country have 
become transformed for different reasons, mainly political and economic. In the 
northern parts of the country, particularly in Dagbon, the system is now divided and 
affiliated to the different factions in the chieftaincy conflict. This is similar in Accra, 
though a variation here is that the conflicts are more influenced by economic reasons. A 
lot of the disputes and violence associated with land-guards are usually the result of the 
double sale of land by chiefs in Accra. These activities by chiefs have resulted in 
disunity and conflicts in some parts of the country.  
Some practices by traditional authorities also infringe upon the human rights, 
not only of the subjects of such traditional authorities, but also of the general 
population. A case in point is the annual celebration of the Homowo festival by the Gas 
in the Greater Accra region. This festival entails a month long ban on drumming prior 
to the celebration of the festival. All residents of Accra, irrespective of religious 
affiliation, are expected to abide by the ban, even if it goes against their own religious or 
cultural beliefs; this is despite the fact that the Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religious practice.  
Also, most traditional and community systems do not offer human rights 
training to their members. Realizing however the importance of such mechanisms in 
delivering justice, institutions like the World Bank have supported training of chiefs in 
basic law and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.72
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 These shortcomings 
notwithstanding, traditional modes of security provisioning remain effective and 
relevant, especially where the communities view legitimate authority to be vested in 
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these institutions, and not in state institutions. 
   
PSCs and PMCS 
With regard to PSCs, their activities help to reduce the security deficit, particularly in 
urban centers. In the face of the police inefficiencies and incapacities, they perform roles 
that would either not have been performed by the police, such as guarding residential 
areas or providing CCTV operations or, if the police were to perform such tasks, like 
guarding airports and other critical national infrastructure, that would have further 
overstretched their limited capacity. Thus, PSCs complement the police, and with 
increased cooperation and collaboration between them, can serve to make the police 
more effective by enabling them to concentrate on other more essential duties such as 
criminal investigations. A Presidential Commission in 1997 looking into the functions of 
the Police Service thus recommended the empowerment of PSCs to take over some 
mundane activities that were being carried out by the police, such as guarding banks, 
and in this vein, recommended an amendment to L.I. 1571 to permit guards to handle 
weapons.73
The downside of PSC operations in the country is that since it is only the wealthy 
who are able to afford their services, crime is displaced from the wealthy 
neighborhoods to poorer communities, thus further increasing and reinforcing existing 
inequalities. With neither minimum training standards nor a legal obligation for PSCs 
to train their guards before deploying them, coupled with the low remuneration of 
guards, some PSCs and employees also constitute more of a security risk than act as 
providers of security. Their profit motivation could supersede moral and ethical 
 The recommendation has still not been implemented. Such cooperation will 
be further enhanced with the operationalisation of the aforementioned hotline between 
the Police Headquarters Operations Room and PSCs. 
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considerations, leading to an exploitation of employees through underpayment, and 
cutting down on quality service delivery to clients. This situation is made possible due 
to the lack of effective oversight of their operations by the Ministry of the Interior, 
The involvement of PMCs in training some of the Ghanaian security agencies 
like the military has both positive and negative implications for security in the country. 
On the positive side, it could be argued that by training such agencies to be more 
tactically and operationally competent, PMCs contribute indirectly to security by 
ensuring that state agencies are able to provide efficient security services as their 
mandates dictate. On the downside however, their lack of expertise in broader aspects 
of security such as human rights and justice issues, which are significantly relevant to 
security provision, and their focus on counter-insurgency operations, make their 
services less beneficial to the majority of Ghanaians. Additionally, since there is no 
parliamentary oversight of their activities, the effectiveness of their services cannot be 
benchmarked, and this situation is made worse by their lack of accountability to the 
Ghanaian state. However, international PMCs basically see the world as a global 
marketplace to sell their expertise, which unfortunately is not in the interest of building 
peace and security in stable states such as Ghana. As such, their involvement in the 
country has minimal benefits to a majority of the population, as their occasional 
involvement in the country aims to simply to make money from whoever is able to pay 
them, in this case the US government. 
 
NWCs 
The NWC concept, sometimes referred to as vigilantism, is common not only in Ghana 
and other developing countries, but even in some developed countries.74
                                                          
74 Button (2002), p. 91  
 These groups 
offer the most relevant security solutions to a lot of Ghanaians. Being formed by 
  
50 
residents to address their specific security concerns, they are able to deliver relevant 
security solutions whilst simultaneously helping to foster a culture of security among 
residents by empowering them to make their own security decisions.  
Notwithstanding these positive contributions, some committee members are 
involved in human rights abuses and extortion of monies from residents as a result of 
the lack of effective oversight by the police. Such activities create insecurity in the 
communities. The Private Security Act is silent on the oversight and supervision of this 
mechanism, making it susceptible to abuse, particularly as the lack of assured means of 
remuneration for committee members could make them collude with criminals and 
armed robbers, negatively affecting security.  
At the same time, they are more suited for physical safety and security, and 
cannot nor should they, deliver justice solutions, not least because they are neither 
trained in the legal aspects of security delivery nor in alternate dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
 
Land-guards 
Land-guards provide security and are an alternate means for individuals, groups and 
organisations to secure their land and property in the face of a complex and inefficient 
land administration policy, coupled with a corrupt and overburdened judicial and 
security system.  They also occasionally arbitrate in disputes over land, and thus help 
preserve peace and security. They thus fill in the gap of the state’s inability to secure the 
property rights of its citizens, in the absence of effective alternatives. 
One reason for the continued existence of land-guards is that the state is unable 
to secure the property rights of individuals, who are forced to seek security elsewhere. 
A more plausible explanation is that it provides a source of livelihood and employment 
for some youth. This partly explains the reason why there have been two responses to 
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the same issue to land and property title and disputes in Accra and Tamale. In Accra, 
due to rapid urbanization and population growth, land is scarce and more expensive, 
thus there are more economic benefits to being a land-guard, whilst the lower 
competition for land and lower socio-economic development of Tamale reduces the 
market for land-guards. Additionally, due to the large influence of urbanization in 
Accra, traditional mechanisms and values are diminished, such that the traditional 
rulers and authority have little authority and influence among the more cosmopolitan 
people, whereas the converse is true for Tamale.  
Generally however, the activities of land-guards are a source of fear and 
insecurity due to the level of violence employed and the destruction of property. Their 
continued existence can also be seen as a manifestation of the weakness of the state to 
enforce its own laws, since their activities have been criminalized. 
 
‘Macho-men’ and Ad-hoc Groups 
The phenomenon of ‘macho-men’ is a political creation that has no positive contribution 
to security in the country. Its continuous existence attests to the lack of political will by 
the political elite to clamp down on illegal activities so long as such activities benefit 
them, and help them achieve their parochial interests. In view of the increased use of 
the country as a transit point for drug trafficking to Europe and North America,75 as 
well as the manufacture and large presence of small arms in the country,76
                                                          
75 Akyeampong (2005), p. 431 
 the 
phenomenon of macho-men has the explosive potential of negatively impacting on 
security in the country, particularly if such groups are recruited by drug traffickers for 
their networks and expertise. Such a prospect is particularly high in the economically 
deprived areas, and would threaten the security and stability of the country through the 
76 Aning (2005), p.79 
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formation of gangs and the attendant turf wars that would ensue.  
Ad-hoc groups that form in reaction to specific threats, such as villagers 
mobilizing against cattle rustling by nomadic Fulani herdsmen, can generally be said to 
contribute positively to security as they enable a rapid response to an immediate 
security threat, and can serve to provide temporary solutions whilst longer-term 
solutions are sought. 
 
NGOs and Civil Society Groups 
Civil society groups and NGOs play diverse roles in conflict prevention and resolution, 
peace building and reconciliation programs to enhance security in the country. Through 
advocacy and the promotion of good governance, they serve to exert pressure on the 
state to provide security beyond a state-centric focus, to cover issues of human security 
such as the rule of law and promotion of human rights, economic empowerment and 
access to health and education, among others. They have been actively engaged in the 
reform of and improved access to the judicial sector and security agencies, and the 
promotion of good practices in the natural resource sector of the country, particularly in 
mining areas. Their advocacy role in promoting responsible practices in the extraction 
of natural resources will be much more pertinent in light of the recent discovery of oil in 
the country, to prevent a situation similar to the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria. Their 
activities are further promoted by the presence of a vibrant media that promotes 
freedom of expression in the country.  
NGO and civil society engagements in the security sector however, are 
sometimes weakened due to limited knowledge, a lack of skills and expertise in the 
field of security and limited resources particularly in the case of the local organisations. 
There is also an increasing proliferation and consequent competition among some 
groups clamoring for relevance and funding from various donor groups.  
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In general, it can be said that these non-state groups have impacted on security in the 
country in both positive and negative ways. Indeed, with the exception of the macho 
men and some land-guards, the other non-state actors positively contribute to security 
in the country in one form or another. The general population perceive their activities, 
apart from the macho men as positively contributing to security, for reasons ranging 
from safety offered by patrols, protection of property, ease of access, a faster delivery of 
justice, and the use of easily understood and culturally relevant procedures, as opposed 
to the legal jargon employed in state court-rooms.  
Additionally, the membership of a majority of these groups are the youth, and 
this  largely debunks the thinking which often associates the activities of unemployed 
youth in Africa with conflict violence and insecurity.77
Theoretically, the evolution of non-state security in the country can be explained 
by the two main theories of private security provisioning, with growth of PSCs 
representing the liberal democratic strand within the fiscal constraints theory, whilst 
traditional mechanisms and neighborhood watch committees are a manifestation of the 
structuralist theory. The relationship between the state security systems and these non-
state actors is however complex, sometimes involving cooperation and at other times, 
competition. Whilst there is cooperation and collaboration with some PSCs, 
neighborhood watch committees and some traditional authorities, the relationship 
 A lot of youth contribute to 
security in their countries by joining such mechanisms, even though they are often 
unpaid for their services. It also reveals that, rather than being passive recipients of 
government policies and solutions, in Ghana, the youth are actively shaping issues that 
affect their safety and security.  
                                                          
77 Collier (2000), p.94 
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between the state institutions on the one hand, and land-guards and macho men on the 
other, is more antagonistic, with interactions usually being restricted to the arrest of 
members by the police, whilst there is sometimes competition between the state and 
traditional authority, especially in the area of justice delivery.  
 
Conclusion  
This study has revealed that despite its relative peace and stability, there is an increase 
in crime and a feeling of insecurity among the general population in Ghana. The state 
security and justice institutions, due to historical reasons and parochial interests, have 
largely been unable to offer security to a large section of the population, with services 
being inordinately focused on hard security and the maintenance of regimes and the 
political and economic elite in power. The use of state police to provide security to 
banks and other commercial organisations, for example, makes even more problematic 
the public and private distribution of security, and reduces the already insufficient 
number of personnel available for public policing duties. This further deprives those 
already marginalized and unable to purchase commercial security services, of state 
police services.  
Largely unable to access adequate security from the state, a large section of 
Ghanaians have resorted to non-state and self-help mechanisms to address the gap in 
security provisioning. These mechanisms include PSCs, communal arrangements like 
NWCs, traditional mechanisms, and less reputable mechanisms such as land-guards 
and the use of ‘macho-men’.  
 Some of the benefits of the use of these non-state mechanisms include the 
provision of safety at a low cost, faster delivery of justice, and the delivery of culturally 
relevant solutions. To an extent, actors such as PSCs, NWCs and traditional 
mechanisms can be seen as the logical extension of the public security agencies, but 
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have no powers of prosecution. They thus make up for the lapses of the state agencies, 
and are largely seen by the public to have a positive impact on security in the country. 
Whilst acknowledging their positive contribution to peace and security in the 
country, and despite the legitimacy conferred on them by their various clients, certain 
activities and operations of some groups have negative effects on security and the socio-
economic development of the country. The operations of PSCs, for example displaces 
crime to poorer sections of the society and serve to further deepen socio-economic 
inequalities, whilst land-guards cause destruction, and through the use of violence, 
create fear and insecurity in the communities where they operate. The lack of effective 
control and enforcement to deal with the illegal activities of land-guards and macho-
men for hire, in particular, is a huge threat to the security of the country. 
On this note, whilst accepting the notion that ideally the state should be the most 
effective guarantor of the security of all its citizens, it has largely been unable to do so, 
partly due to the lack of resources and capacity. It is thus imperative that it harnesses 
the potential and capabilities of other actors, including non-state actors, to achieve the 
effective delivery of security and justice in the country. As stated by Abrahamsen and 
Williams, in Africa, the contemporary security landscape is complex and fluid, 
involving cooperation, competition and numerous interactions between public and 
private agents.78
 
 To this end, the following recommendations are made for the effective 
utilization of such potential by the state: 
 The state needs to improve upon its monitoring and oversight responsibilities over 
the activities of all non-state security actors, banning the activities of some such as 
macho men where necessary and vigorously enforcing such bans.  
 There should be increased collaboration and cooperation between the state and 
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non-state actors within the policing and justice terrain of the country. 
 A national strategy should be formulated that allows ordinary citizens to provide 
input into security and policing decisions in their communities. 
          
From the foregoing, it can be said that, notwithstanding some of the problems 
associated with certain activities of some groups, non-state security actors in Ghana 
generally play the role of filling in the gaps in the delivery of security and justice by 
state institutions, and in the process, have a positive impact on security provision in the 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
57 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abrahamsen Rita & Williams Michael (2007), ‘Introduction: The Privatisation and 
Globalisation of Security in Africa’, International Relations, Vol.32, No.131.  
Abrahamsem Rita and Williams Michael (2008), ‘Public/Private, Global/Local: The 
Changing Contours of Africa’s Security Governance’, Review of African Political Economy, 
Vol.35, No.118, pp.539-553. 
Adu-Mireku, Samuel (2002), Fear of Crime Among Residents of Three Communities in 
Accra, Ghana’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol.43, No. 153.  
Akyeampong Emmanuel (2005), ‘Diaspora and Drug Trafficking in West Africa: A Case 
Study of Ghana’, African Affairs, Vol. 104, No. 416, pp. 429-447.  
Alao Abiodun (2002), ‘Privatisation of Security and Security Sector Reform in     
Uganda’, in Damian Lilly and Michael von Tangen Page eds, Security Sector Reform: The 
Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security, (London: International Alert), 
pp. 31 -54.  
Alkire Sabina (2003), ‘A Conceptual Framework for Human Security’ CRISE Working  
Paper 2, www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper2.pdf, [accessed 10 August, 2009]. 
           Aning Kwesi (2005), 'The Anatomy of Ghana's Secret Arms Industry ', in N.Florquin 
andG Berman, eds, Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the 
ECOWAS Region, pp.78-106.  
Aning Kwesi (2006), ‘An Overview of the Ghana Police Service’, Journal of Security Sector 
Management, Vol. 4, No. 2, www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/4235/an-
overview-of-the-ghana-police-service, [accessed 23 June 2009]. 
Aning Kwesi & Lartey Ernest (no date), Parliamentary Oversight of the Civil Sector; Lessons 
from Ghana, www.cic.nyu/peacebuilding/docs/CIC%Ghana%20SSR%20final.pdf, 
[accessed 23 June 2009].   
Arthur Kojo and Rowe Robert (2009), Asafo Flags: Akan Cultural Symbols Project, 
http://www.marshall.edu/akanart/ASAFO.HTML, [accessed 22 August, 2009]. 
 
  
58 
 Atuguba Raymond (2009), Policing in Ghana, Lecture etc. Presentation at KAIPTC, 30  
  June 2009. 
 
Baker Bruce and Scheye Eric (no date), Supporting State and Non-State Provision of 
Security and Justice, 
www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Events/security_justice_141207/Supporting%20state%
20and%20non-state%20security%20and%20justice.pdf, [accessed 21 August, 2009]. 
Bourne Mike (2008), ‘Security Sector Reform and the Challenges and Opportunitites of   
the Privatisation of Security; in in Damian Lilly and Michael von Tangen Page, eds, 
Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security, 
(London: International Alert), pp. 13-30. 
Bruderlein Claude (2000), The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security, 
www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/report_may2000_2-e.php, [accessed 12 July, 
2009]. 
Button Mark (2002), Private Policing, (Devon: William Publishing). 
Collier Paul (2000), ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective’, in Berdal Mats 
and Malone M, eds, Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (London: 
Lynne Rienner), pp. 91-112. 
CorpWatch (2005), GHANA: Government Urged to Streamline Private Security 
Organisations, www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12218, [accessed 17 June, 2009].  
Department of Criminology (1999) Managing Risk and Security, (Leicester:          
University of Leicester). 
Department of Criminology (2001) Research Methods, (Leicester: University of Leicester). 
Dzivenu Setri (2008), ‘The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion of Traditional Authorities 
in Africa: Chiefs and Justice Administration in Botswana and Ghana’, Political 
Perspectives, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-30.  
Fielding, N and Thomas, H (2001) ‘Qualitative Interviewing’,   in N Gilbert ,ed,          
Researching Social Life, (London: Sage), 123-144. 
’Funmi Olonisakin, Ikpe Ekaette & Badong Paschal (2009), ‘ The Future of Security and          
Justice For the Poor: A ‘Blue Sky’ Think-Piece’, CSDG Policy Studies, No. 21, (London:                 
King’s College). 
  
59 
Ghana News Agency (2008), New Chieftaincy Act Outlines Guidelines for Kingmakers, 
news.myjoyonline.com/news/200808/19202.asp, [accessed 20 August, 2009]. 
Ghana Police Service (n.d.) Police Administration, www.ghanapolice.org,  [accessed 12  
May, 2009]. 
Ghana Police Service (2008), Community Police Unit, 
www.ghanapolice.info/community_police_unit.htm, [accessed 24 July, 2009].  
Gumedze Sabelo (2007), ‘ To Embrace or Not to Embrace: addressing the private security industry phenomenon in 
africa’, in Sabelo Gumedze, ed, Private Security in Africa. Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation, Monograph 
139, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies), pp.3-14.  
Hendrickson Dylan (2008), State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of 
Security Decision-Making, (London: King’s College). 
Holmqvist Caroline (2005), ‘Private Security Companies. The Case for Regulation’, 
SIPRI Policy Paper, No.9, www.books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP09.pdf, [accessed 5 
March, 2009]. 
Ibeanu Okechukwu & Momoh Abubakar (2008), State Responsiveness to  
Public Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making. Nigeria Country   Study’, 
(London: King’s College). 
Isima Jeffrey (2004), ‘Demilitarisation, Non-State Actors and Public Security in Africa: A 
Preliminary Survey of the Literature’, Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol.2, No.4, 
www.ssronline.org/jofssm/jofssm_display.cfm?hc=doc&pi=19, [accessed 21 June 2009]. 
Isima Jeffrey (2009), ‘The Global Marketplace and the Privatisation of Security’, IDS 
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No.2,  pp.113 -120.  
Ismail O and Hendrickson D (2009), What is the Case for a Security and Justice  Focus in 
Development Assistance Programming?: An Assessment of Existing Literature, (London: 
King’s College). 
Johnson S (2007), ‘The Next Battlefront’, Newsweek, 17th September, CL (12): 24-26. Jones 
Trevor & Newburn Tim (1998), Private Security and Public Policing, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Jupp Victor (1989), Methods of Criminological Research, (London and New  York: 
Routledge). 
  
60 
Karikari Isaac (2006), Ghana’s Land Administration Project (LAP) and Land Information  
System (LIS) Implementation: The Issues, 
www.fig.net/pub/monthly_articles/February_2006/karikari_february_2006.pdf,  
Kirunda Solomon (2008), ‘Private and Public Security in Uganda’, in The Private Security 
Sector in Africa, ed.  Sabelo Gumedze, ISS Monograph 146, (Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies). 
Lilly Damian & von Tangen Page Michael (2002), ‘Introduction’, in Damian Lilly and 
Michael von Tangen Page, eds, Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of 
the Privatisation of Security’,(London: International Alert), pp.7-11. 
Macdonald, K (2001) ‘Using Documents’, in N Gilbert, ed, Researching  Social Life, 
(London: Sage),194-210. 
Mamdani M (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
Ministry of Justice (2005), 1992 Constitution of The Republic of Ghana, (Accra:       Allshore 
Company). 
Musah, Abdel-Fatau (2000), ‘A Country Under Siege: State Decay and Corporate 
Military Intervention in Sierra Leone’, in Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode Fayemi, eds, 
Mercenaries. An African Security Dilemma, (London and Virginia: Pluto Press), pp.77 117. 
Open Society for West Africa (2007), Ghana. Justice Sector and the Rule of Law. A 
Discussion Paper, 
www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_Ghana%20JusticeDD.pdf, [accessed 
12 March, 2009]. 
Richards Anna and Smith Henry (2007), ‘Addressing the Role of Private Security 
Companies Within Security Sector Reform Programmes’, Journal of Security Sector 
Reform, Vol.5, No.1, 
www.ssronline.org/jofssm/issues/jofssm_0501_richards&smith.pdf?CFID=1681911&CF
TOKEN=18156348, [accessed 21 July, 2009]. 
Stewart Frances (2004), ‘Development and Security’, CRISE Working Paper 3,  
www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper3.pdf, pp. 1-28.  
Tankebe Justice (2008), ‘Colonialism, Legitimacy and Policing in Ghana’,  International 
Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, Vol.36, No.1, pp.67-84. 
  
61 
 
             
Thomas Caroline (1999), ‘Introduction’, in Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkins, eds, 
Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience (London: Lynne Rienner). 
WACAM (2008), An Association of Communities Affected By Mining, 
www.wacamghana.com/whowhat.html, [accessed 5 August, 2009]. 
Wright Derek and Brooke Jennifer (2007), ‘Filling the Void. Contractors as Peacemakers 
in   Africa’, African Security Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 105-110      
York Peter (no date),  Chieftaincy as Rival Governance in Ghana, 
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/wgape/papers/10_York.pdf, [accessed 23 July, 2009]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
